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ABSTRACT 
Rapid and prompt decision-making during the execution of an F-14 AWG-9 air-
to-air intercept mission has been a continuing problem facing the aircrew over 
the years. The aircrew has had to rely on an inordinate amount of 'gut feel,' 
rule-of-thumb decisions invariably resulting in ad hoc tactic selection. Conse-
quently, it is generally recognized in the air C3 community that realtime Tactical 
Decision Aids (TDAs) are needed by the aircrew in air intercept operations. 
Fortunately, the extended memory and improved processing capabilities of today's 
weapon systems computer have made it feasible to incorporate realtime decision 
aiding algorithms in the onboard software. This paper presents a TDA for the F-14 
aircrew, i.e., the NFO (Na,7al Flight Officer) and pilot, in conducting a multi-
target attack during the performance of a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) role. The TDA 
employs hierarchical multiattribute utility models for characterizing mission 
objectives in operationally measurable terms; rule-based AI-models for tactical 
posture selection; and fast-time simulation for maneuver consequence prediction. 
The TDA makes aspect maneuver recommendations, selects and displays the optimum 
mission posture, evaluates attackable and potentially attackable subsets, and 
recommends the 'best' attackable subset along with the required course perturbation. 
INTRODUCTION 
In a typical F-14 air-to-air mission, the aircrew (Naval Flight Officer and 
pilot) are called upon to make a multitude of decisions in.a rapidly unfolding 
threat environment. A significant proportion of these decisions impact the over-
all outcome of the entire mission. Presently, the aircrew make these decisions 
based upon some combination of training, experience and a limited number of low-
level decision aids provided by the F-14's AWG-9 tactical program. These aids, 
however, have had to be simple due to the limited memory allocation in the onboard 
computer. However, with the emergence of a large number of sophisticated, high 
performance threats, it is generally recognized in the air C3 community that 
onboard tactical decision aids are required in almost all phase.s of an air-to-air 
mission. Fortunately, realtime computer-based TDAs are possible today primarily 
because of the expanded memory and processing power of today's onboard computers. 
It is worth noting, however, that despite the evident need, decision aids if not 
designed from user's viewpoint and task loading can expect great "psychological" 
resistance from the user pool. 
In this paper, a decision aid for assisting the F-14's aircrew in the CAP 
role of a fleet air defense mission is presented. The aid, based on proven 
methods from decision analysis, artificial intelligence and fast-time simulation 
assists the aircrew in the situation assessment and alternative selection functions. 
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Combat Air Patrol (CAP) Role 
In performing its air-to-air missions, the F-14 in the general role of a 
Maritime Air Superiority Fighter acts as an element of the fO'J:'ce Combat Air Patrol 
(CAP). A typical air-to-air fleet defense mission with the F-14 performing a 
Combat Air Patrol (CAP) role is given in Figure 1. The CAP objectives are early 
detection, interception, and. attack of airborne threats that endanger the fleet 
elements. Within the overall CAP role, phases 5, 6, and 7 were selected for 
aircrew aiding because (1) during these phases the aircrew task loading is high 
and (2) feasibility of TDAs can be demonstrated in these phases. 
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Figure 1. CAP Role Vertical Flight Profile 
Phase 5 is station-keeping/loiter. In this phase, the F-14 adheres to a 
patterned flight at a designated position from the task force. This phase termi-
nates when patterned flight ceases upon target detection. 
Phase 6 is target intercept. In this phase, the aircraft pursues a flight 
path toward a relative position (target conversion) on a selected airborne target. 
This phase terminates when both the intent to launch a weapon and the capability 
to effectively launch a weapon exists. 
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Phase 7 is air-to-air combat. In this phase, the aircraft is flown within 
a selected weapon launch envelope against a specific target. This phase includes 
all beyond visual range (BVR) and within visual r£nge (WVR) engagements. The 
air-to-air combat phase terminates when no further launch capabilities exist or 
are desired, and the desired return altitude and speed profile has been attained. 
Decision Structuring for the F-14 CAP. Rol~ 
The F-14 CAP role is comprised of a sequence of decisions leading to engage-
ment with and launch on incoming threats. The typica~ scenario commences with 
de~ection and identification of the set of threats. The NFO.must quickly switch 
radar modes, monitor fuel and weapon system status, decide on the subset of the 
threats to prosecute, select an intercept trajectory, determine the missile launch 
points, and assess ;he results. 
The sequence of actions in this scenario can be efficiently represented 
using a decision tree format, as shown in Figure. 2 • Action decisions, in . 
which the possible choices open to the NFO are listed, are represented by a 
square box. The decision maker is free to choose only one of the actions. Event 
nodes, shown as circles, have as branches all the. outcomes that may occur at that 
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Figure 2. CAP Role Decision Sequence 
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Figure 2. CAP Role Decision Sequence (Cont'd) 
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point in the tree. The events are characterized by their probability of occur-
rence and by the value of the outcome. If one path from the beginning of the tree 
is followed to the end, it describes a possible "scenario." The most effective 
sequence of actions can be determined by taking the expectation (probability 
weighting) of utilities over each alternative. The recommended course of action 
is the one with the highest expected utility. 
In order to perform this type of analysis, values and likelihoods must be 
assigned' to each possible outcome. Since there is not enough time to elicit such 
judgments from the NFO during prosecution of an engagement, results from off-line 
prior analyses must be loaded into the TDA as routines. 
Value estimation in this complex, dynamic environment is best performed using 
multi-attribute utility (MAU) ana1y&is. MAU methods decompose the complex mu1ti-
criterion evaluation problem into more manageable subproblems of scaling, weighting 
and combining criteria. The MAU evaluation can be expressed as a simple aggregate 
of constituent factors. 
Value (Option j) = L P(zk) L' aiU(xijk) events attributes 
k i 
where P(zk) is the probability of occurrence of event k; ai is the importance 
weight of attribute i; and U(xiik) is the utility of attribute i associated with 
option j and event k. This divIde and conquer approach of MAU analysis involves 
defining the problem, identifying relevant dimensions of value, scaling and 
weighting the dimensions, and finally aggregating the dimensions into a single 
figure of merit for evaluation. The specific attribute set for evaluation in the 
F-14 scenario is presented in a later section. 
Arriving at estimates of the probability of occurrence of each outcome is also 
d;'fficu1t. Two approaches are possible: (1) exhaustively list and estimate off-· 
line the likelihood of each consequence in the CAP scenario or (2) perform fast-
time on-line simulations of the maneuver options to analytically determine the 
major consequences. The first approach, using subjective probability estimates, 
is expected to be somewhat unreliable and difficult to implement. Even experienced 
NFOs may be hard-pressed to agree on the probability of adquiring a LAR or encoun-
tering a given threat penetration given a specific situation and maneuver. 
Accordingly, the objectively derived, fast-time simulations were used as much as 
possible in the TDA operation. 
Time Line of the F-14 CAP Role and Aiding Requirements 
The current minimally aided F-14 CA? role will be disc.ussed in the following 
paragraphs with the specific objectives of demonstrating where and when the NFO 
performance can be enhanced via tactical decision aiding. 
The scenario, summarized earlier in Figure 2, commences with the F-14 in a 
CAP role on the verge of a potential new engagement. The F-14 aircrew are informed 
of.new detections and moments later observe target tracks on the Tactical Informa-
tion Display (TID). The NFO at this time has to decide if he want to perform 
intercept or stay on CAP. This decision depends on whether the tracks are identified 
as 'friend1ies' or 'hostiles' and if a successful intercept trajectory to the 
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oncoming targets is feasible. Currently, target identification once completed, 
is d:l.splayed to him on the TID. However, he has no indication if a successful 
intercept is possible or not. He draws upon his past experience to make this 
assessment. If the targets are identified as friendlies, then he stays on CAP. 
If the targets are identified as hostiles and he decides to embark on an intercept 
course he has to decide if the intercept should be performed at maximum rate or 
in fuel conservation fashion. This decision depends on the projected mission 
pr.ofile, and availability of in-flight refueling. Also, he has to determine the 
details of executing his intercept, i.e., should he "swing" an aspect prior to 
pursuing an intercept, should he try to acquire Launch Acquisition Regions (LARS) 
on additional targets or stay with the ones he currently expects to have. Since 
currently he has no way of knowing what the LAR configuration would be if he 
executed specific LAR acquisition maneuvers, he makes this determination on his 
present state of knowledge and 'gut feel.' With regard to perfo~ing an aspect 
he takes into consideration the number of targets he has on the TID. and the 
number of targets with LARS against his current missile load. Not always will he 
make the same decision because his perception of secondary factors like time to 
encounter, and intercept geometry may differ from case to case. However. it is 
safe to say that if the number of LARS and targets are less than his missile 
load. he may try to acquire additional LARS. In any case. his next major decision 
is which subset of targets to go after if there are more targets than missiles and 
in what sequence to attack them. Currently, the intercept trajectory is usually 
head collision based on target centroid. emphasizing instantaneous heading and 
altitude. The firing sequence depends Ort the order'of increasing time until 
optimum range. nominally fifteen percent into LARS. The current mechanization 
has manifest drawbacks. There is no objective criteria for attackable target 
subset selection. The NFO determines who he can go after. generally one at a 
time, and performs the intercept on that basis. The lead collision intercept 
trajectory is also suboptimal across the entire spectrum of intercept geometries 
while the choice of firing sequence is totally ad hoc. 
After having "completed" an engagement. Le •• no further attackable threats. 
the NFO may decide to return to CAP or to the carrier depending on his remaining 
missile and fuel resources. If he has adequate missile and fuel supply. he 
prepares for evaluating a reattack if a new wave of threats is detected. 
THE TACTICAL DECISION AID (TDA) 
Overview 
Several key stages of the CAP role fmmediately present themselves as candi-
dates for aiding. The choice of whether to make an aspect maneuver to gain 
additional information, what course perturbation to perform to acquire additional 
LARS. and which subset of threat to engage are all complex decisions well-suited 
for computer-based aiding. Each of these tasks have well-defined options (turn 
15° left, continue on course, etc.) and discrete outcomes (acquire new track. 
acquire LAR. etc.). Also. the same mission objectives apply to each task. 
The portions of the CAP role dealt with by the TDA are summarized in Figures 
3 and 4. This tree is roughly equivalent to nodes f through k in the original 
de~ision tree (Figure 2). The IDA-assisted decision tree begins with the situation 
assessment state. After a number of targets are detected and identified. LARS may 
or not be present on the targets. If no LARS are present. the NFO may elect to 
stay on the CAP role t prosecute the attack immediately. or perform an aspect 
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Figure 3. Situation Assessment and Alternative Generation 
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maneuver. The TDA ~eva1uates the options on the basis of the number of targets 
present (~), the number of missiles onboard the F-14 (~), and the time to engage-
ment (tE): and make a recommendation to the NFO. Similar situation asaessments are made if there are targets with LARS at the initiation of the engagement. Of course, 
the criteria of evaluation employed in the actual TDA evaluation are more complex 
than that described above. The TDA considers the impact of each choice and outcome 
on the threat to the carrier, on the damage inflicted on the enemy. and on the 
F-14 , s own vulnerability. The specific criteria are developed in detail :I.n sub-
sequent sections. The next stage in the decision tree leads to alternative 
generation (nodes I and J in Figure ?). 
If an aspect maneuver is recommended, on the basis that the predicted number 
of LARS following the maneuver (npL) is greater than the original number of 
LARS (nL), then following the maneuver, the NFO must choose to continue prose-
cution of the threats or return to CAP. A return to CAP would only be called for 
if following the maneuver no ~S were present. 
The above sequence illustrates an important characteristic of the TDA. In-
stead of requiring subjective estimates of the likelihood of LAR acquisition in 
each situation, the LAR tests are made by calling a fast-time simulation. In this 
way, the decision aiding is based on hard data of position, course and speed of 
the F-14 and the. threats. 
Once the aspect maneuver is complete, course perturbation. checks and subset 
generation are performed bv the TDA (Nodes K and L~. Here changes in heading, 
altitude and speed are tested to see if additional LARS result. Then the "best" 
threat subset is recommended for attack. ~he specifics. of what is "best" will be 
covered in the next section. 
In the following paragraphs, the structure and operation of the TDA will be 
presented in terms of: the mission obj ectives hierarchy which "drives" the aid, 
the automated programs for mission posture specification, aspect maneuver recom-
mendation, course perturbation, target subset selection, and display requirements. 
Obj ective Structuring and Mission Success Hierarchy 
The overall mission objective for the F-14 CAP role starting with target 
detection and culminating with target reattack can be summarized in three key 
tradeoff objectives: (1) maximize carrier safety; (2) maximize tactical gains; 
(3) minimize resource expenditure. Each of these objectiv.es can be. embedded in 
a linear multi-attribute representation framewOrk and can be further decomposed 
into eA~licit sub-objectives that themselves constitute measurable attributes 
or have measurable attributes associated with them •. Each of these attributes 
provide a scale for measuring the degree of attainment of the associated sub-
objective. The weighted combination of these attribute levels provide an indi-
cation of the attainment of each parent key obj ective. The weighted cODl.oination 
of the level of attainment of each key objective then. provides a measure of the 
overall mission success objective. The mission success hierarchy is shown in 
Figure 5. The actual choice of the attribute set is extremely important. Dawes 
(1974) states that the choice of factors to include is probably of greater impact 
than the determination of the model form. Desirable characteristics are 
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Figure 5. Mission Success Hierarchy 
accessibility for measurement, independence., monotonicity with preference, com-
pleteness of the set, and meaningfulness for feedback. Monotonicity, in this con-
tent, implies that an increase. in the attribute level always results in an increase 
in preference. If the attribute levels are monot.onic, a simplification is possible. 
Fisher (1972) mid Gardiner (1974) note that a straight line approximation to the 
utility function results in minor losses of model accuracy. The attributes 
selected within the framework of the three key tradeoff objectives th~t charac-
terize the F-14 CAP role mission phase possess the desired characteristics des-
cribed above. These attributes were elicited from Naval Flight officers and 
pilots who jointly agreed upon the selected attribute set. 
The first key objective, maximizing carrier safety, can be decomposed into 
maximizing threat coverage and minimizing target penetration. Threat coverage 
. is measured in terms of the threat associated with the engaged subset of targets. 
The greater the threat engaged the higher the threat coverage. Target penetra-
tion range is defined as (1) the range from Task Force Center (TFC) of either 
the closest penetrating target attacked or the highest priority target attacked 
(whichever is chosen due to situation). Minimizing target penetration range is 
equivalent to maximizing the range from the TFC of either the closest penetI'ating 
or highest priority target while ensuring that the average range of the remaining 
targets from the TFC is above a predeterimined range threshold. 
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Maximizing tactical gains is analogous to maximizing expected kill (EK). 
Thjls objective is not amenable to direct measurement but can be decomposed into 
related operationally measurable objectives, the attainment: of which implies the 
attainment of the related parent objective. Thus, EK is expressed in terms of 
maldmizing (1) the number of Phoenix launch opportunities or the number of targets 
att:acked, (2) the dwell time in LAR, and (3) F-pole. The number ot Phoenix lannch 
opp'ortunities is the number of LARS the F-14 obtains on the threat subset plus the 
~umberof second shot opportunties. A second shot opportunity is predicted if 
a target previously acquired is expected to have a LAR at a time t > k later. 
The second attribute, number of targets attacked, is the number of distinct targets 
in the subset upon which LARS are predicted. The dwell time in LAR is the 
predicted time in seconds between the entry and exit pOints summed across all 
LARS in the subset. The final attribute, F-pole is not directly predictable. 
However, it is proportional to BoPT and inversely proportional to the closing 
rate, VC' Thus, RoPT!VC is employed as an indicator of F-Pole. 
The final key objective, minimizing resource expenditure, implies minimizing 
fuel expenditure. The predictable attribute corresponding to fuel expenditure is 
the fuel remaining after each of the perturbation maneuvers. The prediction of 
each of the operationally measurable attributes is discussed below. 
Predicted Attribute Level Computation. Predictive computation of the various 
attributes that define mission success hierarchy are defined on. normalized 0 to 1 
scales. 
1. Threat Coverage. Threat coverage is defined as the weighted sum of the 
total number of attackable targets (with LAR~) in the subset of targets selected 
for engagement. The weighting factor associated with target i is its lethality 
index~ i.e., the lethality of target i. Lethality, in general, is primarily a 
function of the onboard weapon load and 'the EW capability of that target. These 
two parameters can usually be determined once the target has been identiried. 
There are also some generic tactical doctrines that drive the lethality computation. 
For instance, it is generally agreed upon by the operational community that plat-
forms should be attacked first, so that they ~annot return another day and pose a 
recurring threat to the NEO. Additionally, attacking platforms first provides a 
tactical advantage in that the platforms are denied midcourse guidance correction. 
A second doctrine is that manned aircrafts should be attacked/engaged prior to 
attacking any missiles. However, since such detailed lethality indices were not 
available during the study, a priori lethality values were assigned to the 
different targets modeled in the multi-target KIWI simulation environment. The 
initial implementation was in the form of a table look-up of lethality index 
versus target type for the candidate threats that were simulated. With this 
• simplification, threat coverage can be computed as: . 
k 
Threat Coverage - I 1i 
i-1 
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h 
i 
where 1i, i=l, ••• k, is the lethality of target ij k is the total number of 
targets in the subset selected for attack. 
The above computation. is normalized relative to the product of the number of 
missiles currently onboard and the lethality index associated with the most lethal 
target, Thus, 
k 
all =i~11i/NmiSS • ~x (1i ) 
2. Penetration Range. Penetration range is defined as a weighted combina-
tion of the distance from the Task Force Center (TFC) of either the closest pene-
trating target attack or the highest priority target attacked, and the average 
range from TFC of the remaining targets on the TID. Penetration range as defined 
here should be maximized for the successful attainment of mission objectives. 
If rT is the location (position vector) of the closest penetrating target or 
highest priority target (depending on the context), rTFC is the position vector 
of the Task Force Center and !c is the position vector of the centroid of the 
remaining targets, then maximizing penetration range implies maximizing 
~ 
primary 
objective 
~ 
secondary 
objective 
l-€ and € are the weights associated with the primary and secondary objectives, 
respectively. 
!c is defined by 
1 
.!:c = 0-1 
n-1 
... L r . 
i=1 -:L 
whtrre n is the total number of targets on the TID and .!.i is the location of target 
i. Normalizing, attribute 
where !max (= ~~) is the position of vector of the farthest target in the 
threat cloud. 
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3. Number of Phoenix Launch Opportunities or Number of Targets Attacked. 
The number of Phoenix launch opportunities can be predicted conservatively on 
the basis of the number of targets (i..e., LW) in the selected subset. This 
definition, of course, assumes that no existing LARS will be lost nor new ones 
acquired during the course of the impending engagement. Thus, the number of 
Phoenix launches, n, is given by 
n = D.r' if nT ~ ~ 
n == ~, if ~ > n..r 
where nT is the number of targets in the subset and nK is the onboard missile 
load. 
The normalized attribute is then given by 
4. Cumulative Dwell Time. Dwell time, tD' is defined as the time spent 
in the LA! of a given target. Thus, dwell time in LAR of target i, tD, is given 
by 
t i = IRi - Ri I D _ma_x--::--m_i_n_, i= 1, 2, 3, ••• , k 
Vi 
C 
Cumulative dwell time, Tn' is the sum of the dwell times in the launch zona of 
each individual target. 
L 
target i , i-I, 2, ••• , k 
The normalized attribute dwell time (a22) is given by 
where a .. max rto] ~: l 
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5. F-Pole Range. F-Pole range is the fighter to target range at the end 
of the predicted missile TOF. Maximizing F-Pole range is equivalent to ma~imizing 
closing time for that target. Th~ closest penetrating target i in each subset k 
is found from the closing time to theTFC, t~ • 
i 
where V~ 
i 
• closing rate of target i in subset k on TFC -ll.ioslvi-.YrrFCI~YiosVi 
LrFC • position of vector of TFC 
.d: - position vector of target i in subset k 
Vi' VTFC .. velocities of target and TFC, respectively 
For each closest penetrating target i in each of the subsets k, compute 
R t - optimum range; 
op i ~ 85 R . 
maxi 
[amax - "r "It I; k - 1,2, .... ; 
V - closing rate between fighter and target 
c 
- .ios IXi - VF I 
The normalized attribute level, a 23 for each subset k is given by 
6. Fuel Usage. The last attribute that has to be predicted is the 
fuel remaining following a perturbation maneuver. Each perturbation maneuver 
requiring a change in altitude, speed or heading can be ranked in terms of fuel 
requirements from the most fuel intensive to the least. The ranking along with 
the fuel requirements on a scale of 0 to 1 is given in Tcble 1. The attribute 
level derives directly from the table. 
-199-
Table 1. Fuel Requirements- of- Perturbation Maneuvers 
FUEL 
PERTURBATION MANEUVER REQUIREMENT 
1. CLIMB (+ 2000 Feet) 1.0 
2. INCREASE SPEED (+ .1 MACH) .8 
3. CHANGE HEADING (+ 10~) .2 
4. DESCEND (- 2000 FEET) 0 
5. DECREASE SPEED (- • 1 MACH) 0 
Rituation Assessment-Aid 
Situation assessment in a tactical environment is the process of determining 
the values or levels of the salient attributes or dimensions that characterize the 
tactical problem confrontir-g a decision maker. In the F-14 CAP role aiding context, 
the situation assessment aid provides the NFO with prompt and timely estimates of 
the tactical situation confronting him. This "sensed" information enables the 
NFO to maintain int.imate contact with the time-varying data that characterizes 
the relevant dimensions of the tactical environment. This aid recommends a 
suitable mission posture to the NFO based on a combination of internal and 
external "sensed" conditions. It, further, evaluates if an aspect maneuver is 
warranted given the prevailing tactical configuration and recommends an aspect 
if it is indicated. In the following paragraphs, the key mission postures will be 
identified along with a set of conditions that exhaustively span the transitions 
from one posture to the other. Included also is the rationale and criteria for 
performing an aspect maneuver. 
Tactical Mission Postures. The relative weighting on the various attributes 
in the mission success hierarchy varies according to the tactical situation. A 
total of six postures have been identified, each with a distinct set of attribute 
weights: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Offensive -- maximize number of enemy downed, with secondary goals 
of maximizing carrier safety and resource conservation. (WZ »Wl, W3) 
where WI' W2, W3 are shown in Figure 5. Defensiv:e -- maximize carrier safety, with secondary goals of 
maximizing Ek and resource conservation. (Wl » W2, W3) . 
Conservative/Offensive -- maximize Ek and resource conservation. 
Virtually ignore carrier safety. (W2, W3» WI) 
Conservative/Defensive -- maximize carrier safety and resource 
conservatioon. Virtually ignore Ek. (WI' W3» WZ) Carrier Safety -- maximize carrier safety alone. {WI" 1; W2 '"" W3" 0) 
Ek -- maximize Ek alone. (W2 = 1; WI'"" W3= 0) 
The first four postures, Offensive (0), Defensive (D), Conservative/Offensive 
(C/O), and Conservative/Defensive (C/D), are "trade-off" strategies. Different 
combinations of attributes are emphasized in each. In the offensive posture, for 
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instance, Ek is emphasized at the expense 
final two postures, Carrier Safety and Ek 
puts zero weighting on Ek and resources. 
of carrier safety and resources. The 
are "pure" strategies. Carrier safety 
Ek only weights the Ek attributes. 
The six postures correspond to distinct tactical situations. These can be 
classified by conditions associated with the following tactical variables: 
(1) Threat penetration range. The threat distance from (a) ihe task 
force center or (b) the weapon release line around the carrier. 
(2) Fuel remaining. The amount of fuel left to return to the carrier. 
(3) Numerical advantage. The numbers of missiles compared to the number 
of targets. 
(4) Lethality. Phoenix missile-equivalents of the threats. 
Posture Transition Criteria. An exhaustive set of relations between the 
postures and the conditions are given in Table 2.. For example, defensive posture 
(P2) is called for if high threat level is present, sufficient fuel remains, 
either a numerical advantage or disadvantage exists, and low lethality is present. 
Similar descriptions for the choice of the other postures can be given (see 
Table 2). 
Table 2. Posture Transition Logic 
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If "3 A !1; " Cz .... e,» n.. '3 
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1001 letllal1ty 
Transition-Conditions. There are four conditions which are monitored to 
determine posture transitions. These conditions are: Cl ~threat level, C2 
fuel status, C3 - numerical advantage status, and C4 - cumulative lethality. 
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There are two values necessary to compute the Ci'S. These are LMIN and FUEL-
THRESH. LMIN is the threat cloud lethality threshold (based on a critical missile 
load).l This value is contingent on the scaling of the lethality values that 
reside in a table look-up. Since lethality values ass~ciated with different 
targets were unavailable, esch target in K~WI was assigned a lethality value. 
This information was contained in a table look-up. More sophisticated lethality 
computation scheme based on target identification and missile carrying capacity 
can replace this table look-up in a straightforward manner. FUEL-THRESH is the 
amount of fuel required on the average to fire all missiles onboard the F-14 and 
return to the carrier. THRESH2 is the minimum time threshold for'the cloSing time 
between threat cloud centroid and weapon release time. With'FUEL-THRESH calculated 
for the current situation, the Ci's can be computed as follows: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
If the closing time for the centroid of the threat cloud to weapon 
release time is less than some threshold THRESH2, set Cl to high; 
otherwise, set Cl to low. 
If the fuel- remaining is less than FUEL-THRESH, the critical fuel 
threshold, set C2 to high; otherwise, set C2 to low. 
If the onboard missile load is less than the number of targets, C3 is set to low; otherwise C3 is set to high. 
If the cumulative lethality of the current threat cloud is less than 
LMIN, C4 is set to low; otherwise, C4 is set to high. 
The mapping of the tactical conditions to postures allows the automated 
transition from one posture to another as the sensed situation changes. The TDA 
has access to all of the condition levels and contains the logic for transitioning 
between postures. 
Aspect Maneuver Reconnne~dation.. The first point at which the TDA aids the 
NFO is in the initial aspect maneuver. Here a set of threats has been detected, 
and a decision is needed on whether to perform a horizontal aspect maneuver to 
resolve additional threats behind those currently being tracked. The disadvantage 
of an aspect maneuver is that the F-l4 may end up with an inferior tactical position, 
i.e., have less LARS than currently predicted. What the NFO needs is some means 
of predicting what the resultant LAR configuration would be if he performed an 
aspect maneuver. The TDA performs this pr~dictive computation. If the number of 
LARS is strictly less than the number of missiles but greater than zero, the TDA 
predicts the consequences of a canned aspect maneuver. If the number of LARS 
expected after performing aspect is greater than or equal to the number currently 
expected, the TDA displays the aspect recommendation on the TID, by changing the 
steering dot and displaying uASPECTIt just below the TID buffer readout. If the 
number of LARS is zero and number of targets is' less than or equal to the number 
. of missiles then aspect is predicted and recommendation displayed. On the other 
hand, if nt > Nm, theF-14 either stays on CAP or tries to acquire LARS depending 
on the duration of time to encounter. 
II.e., LMIN • L'tethality i, for all i, where the summation is for each target 
in the threat cloud. 
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The NFO may override the aspect recommendation if he acquires external 
knowledge of the raid structure or if he spots a high priority target in the 
process. If such information is available, he overrides the aspect recommendation 
by pressing the "OVERRIDE'" button on the TDA-dedicated portion of the CAP panel. 
This action results in returning the steering dot to the original position and 
blanking the readout. If the NFO decides to go along with the recommendation, the 
aspect maneuver is performed. (The actual number of resultant LARS mayor may not 
be the same as the number predicted.) The aspect maneuver itself is set to be a 
20-30 degree heading change in the horizontal plane in the direction of increasing 
aspect. The time l"/) ~omplete the maneuver is established :In a look-up table. 
The new coordiml.tes are calculated by the TDA and fed to the steering dot 
program. If the aspect maneuver is recommended,aspect is shown on the TID drum 
and the steering dot is moved to the new course. 
During the time required for the aspect maneuver, the TDA programs are 
suppressed. This is because a sequence of targets with or ·without LARS may come 
into view during the maneuver, requiring continuous updating. Instead, a prediction 
of time to aspect completion is computed and all processing halted until that time 
has elapsed. 
If performing the aspect maneuver results in total loss of LARS and time to 
encounter is less than time to perform LAR acquisition, the NFO may wish to return 
to the CAP role; otherwise, he tries to acquire LARS. In any case, the next major 
decision is one of acquiring additional LARS and generating attackable subsets 
versus generating attackable subsets directly. 
A special situation is present if more than nine targets· appear initially. 
Because of computational constraints, large target sets are pruned down to the 
nine most important targets and these targets are then considered by the TDA. The 
measure of selection is the lethality (missile carrying capacity) divided by the 
closing time (distance/closing velocity). The threats are ranked in decreasing 
order of this measure and the top nine selected for TDA processing. 
Aspect Prediction. Aspect Prediction calculation is called for prior to 
making an aspect recommendation. Typically, an aspectmaneuver is made in order 
to resolve the individual targets in a multiple target raid. As aspect maneuver 
is culminated when the aspect angle is about 300 • Where exactly the fighter ends 
up at the end of an aspect is a function of the F-14 and target heading angles, 
the current F-14 and target velocities, the nominal g-forces employed in a turn 
and the basic assumptions associated with the turn. For instance, a constant 
velocity, fixed radius turn assures minimum fuel usage while a move to the 
desired aspect in minimum time assures the performance of the maneuver in an 
acceptable amount of time. In this instance, each of the considerations are 
warranted because fuel should be cons~rved when possible and the meneuver should 
be done as fast as possible to allow the NFO adequate time to evaluate TDA recom-
mendations en route to actual engagement. The aspect prediction equations are 
derived in Madni, et al (1980). 
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Alternative Generation and Selection Aid 
Attackable Target Subsets 'Generation. An attackable subset is defined as a 
group of targets in which all targets have LARS for a specific location of the F-14. 
Incremental changes in the F-14 location can result in a totally different attack-
able subset. An attackable subset can be no smaller than the onboard missile load 
if the number of targets is greater than the on-board missile load. Thus, if the 
onboard missile load is four, say, then the attackable subset can have no less 
than four targets. 
If the number of LARS is greater than or equal to the number of missiles, ' 
the attackable subsets are generated directly by forming all feasible combinations 
of targets with LARS .corresponding to the current state vector. If the number of 
LARS is less than the remaining number of missiles onboard and time to encounter 
is greater than or equal to time to LAR acquisition, then LAR acquisition maneuvers 
are predi'cted. All possible attackable subsets are genet:ated by forming all feasible; 
combinations of targets with LARS corresponding to the current and perturbed F-14 
state vectors. If in this process, a priority target is selected by the NFO by 
pressing PRIORITY function button on the CAP panel followed by manually hooking 
the target on the TID, then all possible attackable target subsets are scanned to 
determine if they contain the priority target. Only those subsets that contain 
the priority target are viable candidates for subsequent evaluation. 
Attackable Subset Selection. The subset evaluation is accomplished by first 
forming all feasible com~inations of targets with LARS. Feasibility demands that 
the number of targets in the subset is less than or equal to the number of missiles 
onboard and that all geometric constraints are satisfied. Then each subset is 
ass,igned a vector of attribute levels according to projected performance. The 
attributes are defined as before in Figure 5. In this· mission success hierarchy 
all measurements are normalized to 0 to 1 scales, where zero corresponds to the 
worst case possible (max lethality coverage). The attributes are weighted by 
importance. The weighting is also normalized so that an overall zero implies zero 
on all attributes and an overall one implies a one on all attributes. The relative 
weighting itself differs according to tactical situation (the postures in Table 
2) and is estimated through expert elicitation. 
Course perturbation takes the form of positive and negative changes in 
heading, speed and altitude. The step sj.ze is defined at +10 degrees in heading, 
+.1 Mach, and +2000 feet in altitude. All perturbations are checked to determine 
the number of LARS present. 'Target subsets for each perturbation are evaluated 
according to the above process (Figure 6). In the end, a maneuver and subset is 
recommended which has the highest overall utility, according to'the mission posture 
and conditions. This recommendation is displayed by showing "subset recommendation" 
just below the TID buffer readout, and moving the steering dot on the TID display. 
If the "Priority" button is pressed, the priority target can be manually 
hooked by the NFO on the TID. All subsets containing the priority target are 
evaluated as before with the subset with the highest overall utility under the 
prevaility posture being recommended. The manual subset select button allows the 
NFO to disengage the TDA and hook the desired target set manually. The selected 
targets are 'output directly to the steering algorithm. 
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Figure 6. Subset Selection 
NFO-TDA Interface 
CAP Panel Modification. At the very outset of this project, it was esta-
blished that the Computer Access Panel (CAP) was going to be used by the NFO 
to communicate his inputs to the TDA software and that TDA-related information 
was going to be displayed to the NFO on the Tactical Information Display (TID). 
Consequently, the NFO-TDA interface was configured to fit within the space and 
configurational constraints of the aforementioned devices. 
The TDA's implementation on the CAP panel was determined after extensive 
discussions with Naval Flight Officers (NFOs). The ,implementation impacts the 
CATEGORY switch and the message selection pushbuttons. The CATEGORY switch is a 
six position switch which permits sharing the message selection pushbuttons. 
When the CATEGORY switch is rotated, a matrix of labels next to the MESSAGE push-
buttons is changed. When the CATEGORY switch is set to TDA, the'legend associated 
with t~~e ten multi-purpose MESSAGE pushbuttons correspond to the posture, target 
and. ov'erride controls (Figure 7). This mechanization was selected on two counts: 
(l) in the opinion of the NFO's, it fit naturally within their task structure 
and user interface, and (2) it resulted in minimal hardware changes to the existing 
controls and display configuration. 
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Posture Selection Controls. The top six set of huttons correspond to the 
six postures that can be manua!ly selected by the NFO. A button press results 
in the button being backlit signalling selection of the associated posture. This 
feature allows the NFO to keep track of the prevailing posture at all times. The 
postures are automatically selected by the transition program if no NFO posture-
selection is indicated. If the NFO presses a posture button to select the posture 
of his choice, then this selection disengages the TDA posture transition logic and 
his selection posture will then be "frozen" regardless of conditions (and dis-
played just below the TID buffer readouts) until the NFO decides to reset the 
automatic posture selection logic of the TDA. 
Target Selection Controls. The target selection section of the panel consists 
of two buttons: (a) priority target, (b) manual subset select. 'The "priority" 
target button allows the NFO to manually hook one target on the TID. This target 
is then included in all target subsets considered for subsequent evaluation. 
Priority target selection is accomplished by first pressing the priority target 
button and then hooking the target on the TID. The "priority" target button 
responds to button press by flashing and continues to flash until the target is 
hooked. The "manual subset select" button allows the NFO to manually designate 
the entire subset. When first pressed, this button start!! to flash. The NFO 
then hooks each target in turn, until all targets have been hooked. The NFO 
indicates completion of subset selection to the system by pressing the manual 
subset select button once again." When the button is pressed for the second time, 
the flashing light goes off. 
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Ove'rride Controls and Maneuver Displays. The two basic override controls 
are available in the form of "reset" and 1I0verride" buttons, shown in Figure 7. 
The "reset" button allows the NFO to re-engage the automatic posture transition 
logic portion of the TDA. Once this software is invoked, target subset recom-
mendation consistent with the prevailing posture is made automatically by the TDA 
and displayed on the TID along with the necessary course perturbation, if any, 
being indicated by a shift of the steering dot on the TID. There are at least 
three distinctively different occasions when th~ NFO mi,ght wish to use the "reset" 
button: (1) after selecting a posture manually, he decides against the selection; 
(2) after pressing the priority target button, he decides he does not want to 
hook a priority target or hooks a target and decides against'it; (3) after pres-
sing manual subset select he decides against it or after hooking a subset of 
targets he decides that one or more of them are inappropriate. For case (2) or 
(3), if the posture was selected manually, p~eL3ing reset puts the TDA in auto-
matic posture select. If the NFO prefers to stay with his original manual 
selection of posture, he must res elect the posture manually after pressing 
"reset." The "reset" button requires two presses. The reason for this is that 
if accidentally bumped once it will not "erase" the target subset selected thus 
far by the NFO and/or deselect his manual posture selection. Consequently, when 
pressed once, the "reset" button causes a warning to be displayed on the DD, when 
pressed a second tima it disengages the targets selected thus far and turns off 
the priority or manual subset select button backlighting. It also deselects 
the posture if it were manually selected by the NFO and turns off the backlit 
posture buttOl'l. The "override" button allows the NFO to reject (1) a recommended 
aspect maneuver and/or (2) a recommended perturbation maneuver with associated 
subset. 
When an aspect maneuver is recommended, the steering dot is moved on the 
TID and the aspect recommended is displayed as "ASPECT MAN" just below the TID 
buffer readout. When the override button is pressed following an aspect recom-
mendation, the steering dot is returned to 'its previous position, the display 
area assigned to display IIASPECT MAN" is erased, and the TDA program branches 
immediately to subset select rather than waiting for the aspect maneuver to be 
performed. The other recommendation provided by the TDA is that of optimum 
target subset selection with associated perturbation. When this recommendation 
occurs, the subset is brightened, the steering dot is moved on the TID and "LAR 
ACQ MAN" is displayed just below the TID buffer readout. If "override" is 
pressed during a subset recommendation, the "next best" subset with associated 
pel::turbation is presented, the TID steering dot is moved, "LAR ACQ MAN" is 
displayed as before, and subset display on the TID modified accordingly. If 
reject is exercised again, the "LAR ACQ MAN" display is erased but the "neJrct 
best" subset remains the same (i.e., does not change from the previous display). 
In this case, since the NFO finds the TDA's recommendation unsatisfactory, he 
can select the targets JDSnually by "hooking" them on the TID after pressing 
manual subset select. 
TDA Override and Restart Options 
There are three TDA-related KIWI activities that were found to be logical 
abort points for establishing new parameters and re-directing TDA processing. 
These are: 
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(1) Aspect ~neuver. 
(2) Perturbation maneuver. 
(3) Steering to encounter. 
Aspect Maneuver Override. The "override" button may be pressed by the NFO 
at any time during the aspect maneuver sequence. When this happens, only the 
aspect maneuver is aborted, thus, as far as the decision logic is concerned, the 
aspect maneuver is assumed to be completed and the subsequent TDA activities 
remain unaltered. 
Perturbation Maneuver Override. The "override" button m8.y once again be 
pressed by the NFO anytime during the perturbation maneuver. This action causes 
control to be immediately passed to the steering algorithm r~ther than wait for 
completion of the perturbation maneuver before passing control to the stearing 
algorithm. 
The restart options that can be exercised during any of the three logical 
abort points include manual posture selection, target selection, and TDA reset 
Manual Posture Selection. Selecting a posture manually by pressing the 
intended key on the CAP panel will discontinue TDA or KIWI activity at any of 
the three abort points and pass control to the subset optimization procedure. 
If posture is altered prior to target detection, the TDA decision sequence is 
unaffected. 
Target Selection. Pressing "manual subset select" or "priority target" 
disengages the TDA or KIWI at any of the three abort points. After manually 
selecting targets with "manual subset select," control is passed illDllediate1y to 
the steering algorithm. When a priority target is selected, control is passed 
to the subset optimization procedure in the TDA. Optimization is performed 
with the constraint that the priority target must be contained in the "optimum 
subset." 
TDA Reset. When this button is pressed, the TDA or KIWI is disabled at any 
of the three abort points and control is passed to the initial target acquisition 
phase of KIWI with automatic posture updating. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has presented a realtime Tactical Decision Aid (TDA) for the F-14 
aircrew in air intercept operations associated with the Combat Ai~ Patrol (CAP) 
role. The aid has been designed with special emphasis on ensuring that (1) its 
. operation fits naturally within the task structure of the aircrew; and (2) it 
in no way appears to usurp any of the aircrews' traditional activities. While 
it was recognized that there is strong preference among the user community for the 
display of options rather than the optimum (Mackie, 1980), the short itme horizons 
associated with air intercept tactics preclude the aircrew frc1m scanning and 
cogitating the various alternatives. Consequently, the aid allows the aircrew 
to exercise manual override over any recommendation it makes. The aid is 
currently being implemented in the multiple target environment of the KIWI 
simulator, a realtime AWG-9 simulation at Naval Air Development Center, Warmins.ter,. 
Pennsylvania. 
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